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(54) **Selective detection of malicious computer code**

Selektives Erkennen von böswilligem Rechnercode

Détection sélective de code informatique malveillant

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**EP 1 408 393 B1**

## Description

[0001] This invention relates generally to detecting the presence of malicious code in computer files, and more particularly to improving the performance of malicious code detection methods.

[0002] During the brief history of computers, system administrators and users have been plagued by attacking agents such as viruses, worms, and Trojan Horses, which may be designed to disable host computer systems and propagate themselves to connected systems.

[0003] In recent years, two developments have increased the threat posed by these attacking agents. Firstly, increased dependence on computers to perform mission critical business tasks has increased the economic cost associated with system downtime. Secondly, increased interconnectivity among computers has made it possible for attacking agents to spread to a large number of systems in a matter of hours.

[0004] Attacking agents can infect a system by replacing the executable code stored in existing files. When the system attempts to execute the code stored in these files, it instead executes malicious code inserted by the attacking agent, allowing the attacking agent to gain control of the system. Virus scanning utilities, such as Norton Antivirus, produced by Symantec Corporation of Cupertino, California, allow a user to determine whether a file containing executable code has been infected with malicious code.

[0005] Traditionally, these utilities have been able to detect viruses by checking for suspicious sections of code in designated locations or looking for other easily detectable characteristics. These methods can be performed quickly, with little burden to system resources.

[0006] However, as attacking agents have become more sophisticated, scanning utilities have needed to perform even more complicated tests to detect the presence of malicious code. For example, special purpose code may have to examine large portions of a file or perform complicated emulation techniques to detect the presence of viruses.

[0007] These techniques must often be performed serially, and are extremely time and resource intensive. Optimizing these routines sufficiently to prevent them from becoming prohibitively time consuming when applied to a large number of files is becoming extremely difficult as attacking agents grow in number and complexity. What is needed is a way to improve the speed and reliability of detection techniques.

WO 00/28420 describes scanning a file with an antivirus module and storing in a critical sectors file a hash for each scanned sector, a date of a most recent update of the module and a version number of the module. The critical sectors file is transmitted with the file to a recipient computer where the hash value is recalculated and compared with the stored value.

Aspects of the present invention are set out in the appended independent claims.

[0008] Embodiments of the present invention comprise methods, systems and computer readable media for determining whether a compute file (340) has been infected by an attacking agent. A scanning engine (205) generates a new hash of a critical viral target region of the file (340) and compares it to a stored hash of the critical viral target region. For each attacking agent, the scanning engine (205) determines whether the file (340) has been scanned by the most recent Version of a detection module (425) associated with the attacking agent. If the hashes are identical and the file (340) has been scanned by the most recent version of the detection module (425), the scanning engine (205) determines that the file (340) is free of infection by the attacking agent.

## Brief Description of the Drawings

[0009] These and other more detailed and specific objects and features of the present invention are more fully disclosed in the following specification, reference being had to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0010] Figure 1 is a high level block diagram illustrating a computer system 100 on which malicious code may be detected.

[0011] Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating a closer view of the memory 106 and the storage 108 of the computer system 100 of Figure 1.

[0012] Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating an entry 300 in a scanning history database 215.

[0013] Figure 4 is a block diagram illustrating a closer view of a scanning engine 205.

[0014] Figure 5 is a flow chart illustrating a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

## Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments

[0015] An embodiment provides for determining whether a file 340 contains malicious code by checking a hash of a critical viral target region (CVTR)

[0016] As used herein, a CVTR refers to a region of a file 340 that is usually Changed when the file 340 is infected with malicious code. CVTRs may be specific to a file 340 and can include the executable file header; the region around a main program entry point, the relocation of the file 340, or any section of the file 340 that would likely be modified by an attacking agent. A file may include multiple CVTRs, each associated with particular attacking agents.

[0017] As used herein, the term "malicious code" refers to any program, module, or piece of code that enters a computer without an authorized user's knowledge And/or against an authorized user's wishes. The term "attacking agent" includes Trojan Horse programs, worms, viruses, and other such insidious software that insert malicious code into a file 340. An attacking agent may include the ability to replicate itself and compromise other computer systems. As used, herein the terms "infected" and "infection" refer to the process of inserting malicious code

in a file.

**[0018]** As used herein, a "hash" or "hash function" is a one-way function, from a variable sized input to a fixed size output that is Substantially collision free. Normally, the output is smaller than the input. "One-way" means that it is easy to compute the output from the input, but computationally infeasible to compute the input from the output. "Substantially collision free" means that it is very difficult to find two or more inputs that hash to the same output. Examples of suitable hash functions usable in the embodiment are MDS and a CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) function.

**[0019]** Figure 1 is a high level block diagram illustrating a computer system 100 on which malicious code may be detected. Illustrated are a processor 102 coupled to a bus 104. There may be more than one processor 102. Also coupled to the bus 104 are a memory 106, a storage device 108, a keyboard 110, a graphics adapter 112, a pointing device 114, and a network adapter 116. A display 118 is coupled to the graphics adapter 112.

**[0020]** The processor 102 may be any specific or general-purpose processor such as an INTEL x86 or POWERPC-compatible central processing unit (CPU). The storage device 108 may be any device capable of holding large amounts of data, such as a hard drive, compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), DVD, or some other form of fixed or removable storage device.

**[0021]** The memory 106 holds instructions and data used by the processor 102. The pointing device 114 may be a mouse, touch-sensitive display, or other type of pointing device and is used in combination with the keyboard 110 to input data into the computer system 100. The types of hardware and software within the computer system 100 may vary.

**[0022]** Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating a closer view of the memory 106 and storage 108 of the computer system 100 of Figure 1. The memory 106 includes a scanning engine 205 that detects the presence of malicious code in the computer system 100.

**[0023]** The scanning engine 205 comprises group of modules that are stored on the storage 108 and loaded into memory 106. As used herein, the term "module" refers to computer program logic and/or any hardware or circuitry utilized to provide the functionality attributed to the module. A module may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof.

**[0024]** The scanning engine 205 identifies data to be checked for the presence of attacking agents, checks for the attacking agents, and, if necessary, responds to a detected attacking agent. Typically, the data to be checked reside in the storage device 108, the memory 106, or both. The scanning engine 205, therefore, identifies particular files 210 and/or memory locations to be checked for attacking agents. Other data that may be identified by the scanning engine 205 include emails received or sent by the computer system 100, streaming data received from the Internet, etc. The scanning engine 205 includes a version identifier which is updated when-

ever a new version of the scanning engine 205 is installed.

**[0025]** The storage 108 includes executable files 210 and a CVTR database 215. The executable files 210 are files containing executable code that are executed by the computer system 100 to perform various computational tasks. The CVTR database 215 contains scanning information related to each of the executable files 210. The CVTR database 215 preferably stores a CVTR region 310 of each of the executable files 210, a file identifier 305, and identifiers 320 indicating the most recent version of the scanning engine 205 applied to the file 340.

**[0026]** Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating an entry 300 in a CVTR database 215. Each entry 300 stores information about a file 340. The entry 300 includes a file identifier 305, which uniquely identifies the file 340 for the scanning engine 205. The file identifier 305 can be the file name or can be a hash of a unique portion of the file 340. Using a hash as an identifier allows the scanning engine 205 to identify files 210 even if the name of the file 340 has been changed, maliciously or otherwise.

**[0027]** The entry 300 additionally includes a section 310 storing hashes of one or more CVTR regions of the file 340. These hashes are generated when the scanning engine 205 performs a complex scan of the file 340. The section 310 may include a hash of a single CVTR which is used in the detection of all attacking agents. Alternatively the section 310 may store hashes of multiple CVTRs, with each CVTR associated with one or more attacking agents. Detected changes in a CVTR, such as an increase to a size field are indicative of possible infection by an attacking agent, but may not be useful as an indicator of a specific attacking agent. However, the absence of change to any CVTR is a reliable indicator that an attacking agent has not inserted malicious code in the file 340.

**[0028]** Each entry 300 also includes a complex virus detection algorithm version (CVDVAV) 320 section. Each CVDVAV section 320 stores the version of the scanning engine 205 last used to scan the file 340. When a newer version of the scanning engine 205 performs a scan of the file 340 for any attacking agent, the CVDVAV section 320 is updated.

**[0029]** Figure 4 is a block diagram illustrating a closer view of a scanning engine 205. The scanning engine 205 includes a selection module 410. The selection module 410 determines which tests to apply to the executable files 210. The selection module 410 is configured to evaluate a database entry 300 for the file 340 and determine which simple detection modules 420 and complex detection modules 425 to apply to the file 340.

**[0030]** A hash generator 430 is configured to generate a hash of a CVTR region of a file 340. The generated hashes are compared with the previously generated hashes 310 stored in the CVTR database 215 to determine whether the file 340 has changed.

**[0031]** The scanning engine 205 includes a group of simple detection modules 420. These detection modules

420 typically check selected areas of a file 340 for distinct code sequences or other signature information. Alternatively, the modules 420 may check the file 340 for distinctive characteristics such as a particular size. Each of the simple detection modules 420 is associated with a particular attacking agent. The scanning engine 205 typically applies multiple simple detection modules 420 in parallel.

**[0032]** The scanning engine 205 additionally includes a set of complex detection modules 425. These detection modules 425 are configured to perform more advanced tests on a file 340 to determine whether malicious code is present. For example, a complex detection module 425 is useful for detecting the presence of a polymorphic encrypted virus. A polymorphic encrypted virus ("Polymorphic virus") includes a decryption routine and an encrypted viral body. To avoid standard detection techniques, polymorphic viruses use decryption routines that are functionally the same for each infected file 340, but have different sequences of instructions. Thus, the scanning engine 205 cannot detect a polymorphic virus by applying one of the simple detection modules 420. Instead, the scanning engine 205 uses a complex detection module 425 that loads the executable file 340 into a software-based CPU emulator acting as a simulated virtual computer. The file 340 is allowed to execute freely within this virtual computer. If the executable file 340 does contain a polymorphic virus, the decryption routine is allowed to decrypt the viral body. The detection module 425 detects the virus by searching through the virtual memory of the virtual computer for a signature from the decrypted viral body. The complex detection modules 425 may also be configured to detect metamorphic viruses, that, while not necessarily encrypted, also vary the instructions stored in the viral body, or any other type of attacking agent that cannot be detected through simple signature based detection.

**[0033]** Typically, each of the complex detection modules 425 is associated with a particular attacking agent and is equipped to detect its presence, though in alternate embodiments multiple detection modules 425 may be associated with a single attacking agent, or a single detection module 425 may be equipped to detect multiple attacking agents.

**[0034]** Each of the complex detection modules 425 includes a version number indicating the last version of the scanning engine 205 to contain an updated version of the detection module 425. When a new version of the scanning engine 205 is installed, the newer versions of those detection modules 425 that are updated contain the version identifier of the newly installed version of the scanning engine 205. This information allows the scanning engine 205 to determine whether a file 340 has been checked with a newest version of a detection module 425. The scanning engine 205 checks the CVDAV entry 320 associated with a file 340 to determine the last version of the scanning engine 205 applied to the file 340.

**[0035]** Figure 5 is a flow chart illustrating a preferred

embodiment of the present invention. The process begins with the scanning engine 205 applying 505 the simple detection modules 420 to the file 340 to be scanned. Typically, this process is performed until all of the simple detection modules 420 have been applied to the file 340. The hash generator 430 then reads the file 340 and computes 510 a hash of the critical viral target region of the file 340.

**[0036]** The selection module 410 then determines 520 whether the CVTR database 215 includes an entry 300 for the current file 340. If the file 340 is not in the database 215, the selection module 410 applies 525 a complex detection module 425 to the file 340.

**[0037]** If the file 340 appears in the database 215, the selection module 410 determines 535 whether the file 340 has been scanned by the newest version of the detection module 425 by checking the CVDAV section 320 of the entry 300 corresponding to the file 340 in the CVTR database 215 to determine the version of the scanning engine 205 that was last applied to the file 340. The selection module 410 then checks the version number of the current complex detection module 425 to determine the last version of the scanning engine 205 to contain an update to the detection module 425. If the version number of the scanning engine 205 last applied to the file 340 is equal or higher than the version number of the most recent version of the scanning engine 205 to contain an update to the detection module 425, the scanning engine 205 determines that the file 340 has been scanned with the most recent version of the current detection module 425.

**[0038]** If the selection module 410 determines that the file 340 has not been scanned by the most recent version of the detection module 425, the scanning engine 205 applies 525 the newest complex detection module 425 to the file 340.

**[0039]** If the CVDAV section 320 indicates that the file 340 was scanned with the current detection module, the selection module 410 determines 540 whether the CVTR has changed by comparing the newly generated CVTR hash to the hash 310 stored in the CVTR database 215. If the selection module 410 determines that the CVTR has changed, the scanning engine 205 applies the complex detection module 425 to the file 340. If the selection module 410 determines that the CVTR has not changed, the selection module 410 approves 542 the file as not infected by the current attacking agent. The process is repeated 545 for each complex detection module 425, until the file 340 has been tested for every attacking agent known to the scanning engine 205.

**[0040]** If a complex scan is performed 525 on the file 340 for any attacking agent, the update module 415 updates 548 the CVTR database 215 to reflect any changes. The update module 415 stores the recently generated CVTR hash in the hash field 310 and stores the current version number of the scanning engine 205 in the CVDAV field 320. If no entry previously existed for the file 340, the update module 415 creates a new entry 300, stores

the recently generated CVTR hash in the hash field 310 and stores the version number of the current scanning engine 205 in the CVDAV field 320. The scanning engine 205 then stops 550 scanning the file 340.

The present invention can be implemented by a computer program operating on a standard desk top computer. An aspect of the present invention thus provides a storage medium storing processor implementable instructions for controlling a processor to carry out the method as hereinabove described.

Further, the computer program can be obtained in electronic form for example by downloading the code over a network such as the internet. Thus in accordance with another aspect of the present invention there is provided an electrical signal carrying processor implementable instructions for controlling a processor to carry out the method as hereinbefore described.

The above description is included to illustrate the operation of the preferred embodiments and is not meant to limit the scope of the invention. The scope of the invention is to be limited only by the following claims. From the above discussion, many variations will be apparent to one skilled in the relevant art that would yet be encompassed by the scope of the invention.

## Claims

1. A method of operating a system (205,215) for detecting infection of a computer file (340) by any one of a plurality of attacking agents, the method comprising the steps of:

generating (510) a new hash of a critical viral target region of the file; and for each attacking agent performing the steps of:

comparing (540) the new hash of the critical viral target region to a previously generated hash of the critical viral target region;  
determining (535) whether the file has been scanned for infection by the attacking agent with a most recent version of a respective detection module (425); and  
determining (542) that the file has not been infected by the attacking agent when the new hash and the previously generated hash are identical and the file is determined to have been scanned with the most recent version of the detection module.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of for each attacking agent applying the detection module to the file in response to a determination that the file has not been scanned by the most recent version of the detection module.
3. The method of claim 2, further comprising the step

of for each attacking agent updating an indicator of a most recent version of a scanning engine applied to the file to indicate a current version of the scanning engine.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of determining whether the file has been scanned for infection by the attacking agent with a most recent version of the detection module comprises the substeps of:

determining a most recent version of a scanning engine applied to the file;  
determining a most recent version of the scanning engine to include an updated version of the detection module; and  
determining that the file has been scanned with the most recent version of the detection module when the most recent version of the scanning engine applied to the file was not created earlier than the most recent version of the scanning engine to include an updated version of the detection module.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of applying (525) the detection module to the file in response to a determination that the new hash and the previously generated hash are not identical.

6. The method of claim 5, further comprising the step of replacing (549) the previously generated hash of the critical viral target region with the new hash of the critical viral target region.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the critical viral target region includes an executable file header.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the critical viral target region includes a start of a relocation section.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the critical viral target region includes a region around a program entry point.

10. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein said steps are preceded by a further step of performing a set of high speed scans on the file using a corresponding set of simple detection modules (420).

11. A system for detecting infection of a computer file (340) by any one of a plurality of attacking agents, the system comprising:

a plurality of detection modules (425) each configured to check the computer file for infection by a respective one of the attacking agents, the detection module including an identifier of a most recent version of a scanning engine (205) to include an update to the detection module;

a database (215), in communication with the detection modules, and storing entries, each entry associated with a file (340) and containing a previously generated hash (310) of a critical viral target region and an identifier (320) indicating a most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file for the presence of malicious code; a hash generator (430), in communication with the database, and configured to generate a new hash of the critical viral target region; a selection module (410), in communication with the database and the hash generator, and configured for each attacking agent to:

compare the new hash of the critical viral target region to the previously generated hash of the critical viral target region; compare the identifier of the most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file to the identifier of the most recent version of the scanning engine to include an update of the detection module; and determine that the file has not been infected by an attacking agent when the new hash and the previously generated hash are identical, and the most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file is not an earlier version than the most recent version of the scanning engine to include an update of the detection module.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the selection module is further configured to:

apply the detection module to the file in response to a determination that the most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file is an earlier version than the most recent version of the scanning engine to include an update of the detection module.

13. The system of claim 12, further comprising an update module (415), in communication with the database and with the selection module, and configured to update the identifier of the most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file to indicate that the most recent version of the scanning engine to scan the file is the current version of the scanning engine.

14. The system of claim 11, wherein the selection module is further configured to apply the detection module to the file in response to a determination for the respective attacking agent that the new hash and the previously generated hash are not identical.

15. The system of claim 14, wherein an update module (415) is configured to update the database to store the new hash of the critical viral target region.

16. A system as claimed in claim 11 comprising a set of simple detection modules (420) operable to perform high speed scans on the file.

17. A computer-readable medium containing computer code instructions for controlling a system to carry out all of the steps of a method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 10.

18. An electrical signal carrying processor implementable instructions for controlling a processor to carry out the method of any one of claims 1 to 10.

## Patentansprüche

1. Verfahren zum Betreiben eines Systems (205,215) zum Erkennen der Infizierung einer Computerdatei (340) mit einem beliebigen, aus einer Vielzahl von Mitteln zum Angriff auf die Datensicherheit (Angriffsmitteln), wobei das Verfahren folgende Schritte umfasst:

erzeugen (510) eines neuen Hash-Wertes eines kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs der Datei; und für jedes Angriffsmittel durchführen folgender Schritte:

vergleichen (540) des neuen Hash-Wertes des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs mit einem zuvor erzeugten Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs; feststellen (535), ob die Datei auf Infizierung mit dem Angriffsmittel mit einer neuesten Version eines entsprechenden Erkennungsmoduls (425) gescannt wurde, und feststellen (542), dass die Datei nicht mit dem Angriffsmittel infiziert ist, wenn der neue Hash-Wert und der zuvor erzeugte Hash-Wert identisch sind und wenn festgestellt wird, dass die Datei mit der neuesten Version des Erkennungsmoduls gescannt wurde.

2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, weiter umfassend den Schritt, dass für jedes Angriffsmittel das Erkennungsmodul auf die Datei angewandt wird, in Antwort auf eine Feststellung, dass die Datei nicht mit der neuesten Version des Erkennungsmoduls gescannt wurde.

3. Verfahren nach Anspruch 2, weiter umfassend den Schritt, dass für jedes Angriffsmittel ein Indikator einer neuesten Version einer Scan-Engine aktualisiert wird, die auf die Datei angewandt wird, um eine aktuelle Version der Scan-Engine zu kennzeichnen.

4. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der Schritt des

Feststellens, ob die Datei mit einer neuesten Version des Erkennungsmoduls auf Infizierung mit dem Angriffsmittel gescannt wurde, folgende Teilschritte umfasst:

- feststellen einer neuesten Version einer Scan-Engine, die auf die Datei angewandt wird; feststellen einer neuesten Version der Scan-Engine, um eine aktualisierte Version des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen; und feststellen, dass die Datei mit der neuesten Version des Erkennungsmoduls gescannt wurde, wenn die neueste Version der Scan-Engine, die auf die Datei angewandt wurde, nicht früher erzeugt wurde, als die neueste Version der Scan-Engine, um eine aktualisierte Version des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen. 5
5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, weiter umfassend den Schritt des Anwendens (525) des Erkennungsmoduls auf die Datei, in Antwort auf eine Feststellung, dass der neue Hash-Wert und der zuvor erzeugte Hash-Wert nicht identisch sind. 10
6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 5, weiter umfassend den Schritt des Ersetzens (549) des zuvor erzeugten Hash-Wertes des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs durch den neuen Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs. 15
7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der kritische Virus-Zielbereich einen Anfangskennsatz einer ausführbaren Datei enthält. 20
8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der kritische Virus-Zielbereich den Anfang eines Auslagerungsbereichs enthält. 25
9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei der kritische Virus-Zielbereich einen Bereich um einen Programm-eintrittspunkt enthält. 30
10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei den besagten Schritten ein weiterer Schritt vorausgeht, in welchem ein Satz von Hochgeschwindigkeitsscans der Datei unter Verwendung eines korrespondierenden Satzes einfacher Erkennungsmodule (420) durchgeführt wird. 35
11. System zum Erkennen der Infizierung einer Computerdatei (340) mit einem beliebigen, aus einer Vielzahl von Angriffsmitteln, wobei das System umfasst: 40
  - eine Vielzahl von Erkennungsmodulen (425), von denen jedes so konfiguriert ist, dass es die Computerdatei auf Infizierung mit einem jeweiligen Angriffsmittel überprüft, wobei das Erkennungsmodul ein Identifizierungszeichen einer 45

neuesten Version einer Scan-Engine (205) enthält, um eine Aktualisierung des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen;

eine Datenbank (215), die mit den Erkennungsmodulen kommuniziert und Einträge speichert, wobei jeder Eintrag einer Datei (340) zugeordnet ist und einen zuvor erzeugten Hash-Wert (310) eines kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs und ein Identifizierungszeichen (320) enthält, das eine neueste Version der Scan-Engine anzeigt, um die Datei auf die Anwesenheit von böartigem Code zu scannen;

einen Hash-Generator (430), der mit der Datenbank kommuniziert und der so ausgelegt ist, dass er einen neuen Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus

ein Selektionsmodul (410), das mit der Datenbank und dem Hash-Generator kommuniziert, und so konfiguriert ist, dass es für jedes Angriffsmittel:

den neuen Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs mit dem zuvor erzeugten Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs vergleicht;

das Identifizierungszeichen der neuesten Version der Scan-Engine, mit der die Datei gescannt wird, mit dem Identifizierungszeichen der neuesten Version der Scan-Engine vergleicht, um eine Aktualisierung des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen; und

feststellen, dass die Datei nicht mit einem Angriffsmittel infiziert ist, wenn der neue Hash-Wert und der zuvor erzeugte Hash-Wert identisch sind und die neueste Version der zum Scannen der Datei verwendeten Scan-Engine keine ältere Version als die neueste Version der Scan-Engine ist, um eine Aktualisierung des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen.

12. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei das Selektionsmodul weiterhin so konfiguriert ist, dass es:

das Erkennungsmodul auf die Datei anwendet, in Antwort auf eine Feststellung, dass die neueste Version der zum Scannen der Datei verwendeten Scan-Engine eine ältere Version als die neueste Version der Scan-Engine ist, um eine Aktualisierung des Erkennungsmoduls einzubeziehen.

13. System nach Anspruch 12, weiter umfassend ein Aktualisierungsmodul (415), das mit der Datenbank und mit dem Selektionsmodul kommuniziert und das so konfiguriert ist, dass das Identifizierungszeichen der neuesten Version der zum Scannen der Datei verwendeten Scan-Engine aktualisiert wird, um anzuzeigen, dass die neueste Version der zum Scannen der Datei verwendeten Scan-Engine die aktuelle Version der Scan-Engine ist. 50

14. System nach Anspruch 11, wobei das Selektionsmodul weiterhin so ausgelegt ist, dass es das Erkennungsmodul auf die Datei anwendet, in Antwort auf eine Feststellung, dass für das entsprechende Angriffsmittel der neue Hash-Wert und der zuvor erzeugte Hash-Wert nicht identisch sind. 5
15. System nach Anspruch 14, wobei ein Aktualisierungsmodul (415) so konfiguriert ist, dass es die Datenbank aktualisiert, damit diese den neuen Hash-Wert des kritischen Virus-Zielbereichs speichert. 10
16. System nach Anspruch 11, umfassend einen Satz einfacher Erkennungsmodul (420), deren Funktion darin besteht, Hochgeschwindigkeitsscans auf die Datei anzuwenden. 15
17. Computerlesbares Medium, das Befehle in Maschinensprache enthält, um ein System so zu steuern, dass es sämtliche Schritte eines Verfahrens nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 10 ausführt. 20
18. Elektrisches Signal, das prozessorimplementierbare Befehle trägt, um einen Prozessor zu steuern, damit dieser das Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 10 ausführt. 25
- Revendications** 30
1. Procédé de mise en oeuvre d'un système (205, 215) destiné à détecter l'infection d'un fichier informatique (340) par l'un quelconque parmi une pluralité d'agents agressifs, le procédé comprenant les étapes consistant à : 35
- générer (510) un nouveau hachage d'une région cible virale critique du fichier ; et, pour chaque agent agressif, réaliser les étapes consistant à : 40
- comparer (540) le nouveau hachage de la région cible virale critique à un hachage précédemment généré de la région cible virale critique ; 45
- déterminer (535) si, oui ou non, le fichier a été examiné en vue de la détection d'une infection par l'agent agressif avec une version la plus récente d'un module de détection respectif (425) ; et 50
- déterminer (542) que le fichier n'a pas été infecté par l'agent agressif quand le nouveau hachage et le hachage précédemment généré sont identiques et qu'on a déterminé que le fichier a été examiné avec la version la plus récente du module de détection. 55
2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant de plus l'étape consistant à, pour chaque agent agressif, appliquer le module de détection au fichier en réponse à la détermination du fait que le fichier n'a pas été examiné par la version la plus récente du module de détection.
3. Procédé selon la revendication 2, comprenant de plus l'étape consistant à, pour chaque agent agressif, mettre à jour un indicateur d'une version la plus récente d'un moteur d'examen appliqué au fichier pour indiquer une version courante du moteur d'examen.
4. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel l'étape consistant à déterminer si, oui ou non, le fichier a été examiné en vue de détecter une infection par l'agent agressif avec la version la plus récente du module de détection comprend les sous-étapes consistant à : 60
- déterminer une version la plus récente d'un moteur d'examen appliqué au fichier ; 65
- déterminer une version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour inclure une version mise à jour du module de détection ; et 70
- déterminer que le fichier a été examiné avec la version la plus récente du module de détection quand la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen appliqué au fichier n'a pas été créée avant la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour inclure une version mise à jour du module de détection. 75
5. Procédé selon la revendication 1 comprenant de plus l'étape consistant à appliquer (525) le module de détection au fichier en réponse à une détermination du fait que le nouveau hachage et le hachage précédemment généré ne sont pas identiques. 80
6. Procédé selon la revendication 5 comprenant de plus les étapes consistant à remplacer (549) le hachage précédemment généré de la région cible virale critique par le nouveau hachage de la région cible virale critique. 85
7. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel la région cible virale critique comprend une en-tête de fichier exécutable. 90
8. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel la région cible virale critique comprend un début d'une section de relocalisation. 95
9. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel la région cible virale critique comprend une région située autour d'un point d'entrée de programme. 100



10. Procédé selon la revendication 1 dans lequel lesdites étapes sont précédées par une étape supplémentaire consistant à réaliser un ensemble d'examens à haute vitesse sur le fichier en utilisant un ensemble correspondant de modules de détection simples (420). 5
11. Système destiné à détecter une infection d'un fichier informatique (340) par l'un quelconque parmi une pluralité d'agents agressifs, le système comprenant : 10
- une pluralité de modules de détection (425), chacun de ces modules étant configuré pour vérifier le fichier informatique en vue de détecter une infection par l'un respectif des agents agressifs, le module de détection comprenant un identifiant d'une version la plus récente d'un moteur d'examen (205) pour inclure une mise à jour vers le module de détection ; 15
- une base de données (215), en communication avec les modules de détection, et stockant des entrées, chaque entrée étant associée à un fichier (340) et contenant un hachage précédemment généré (310) d'une région cible virale critique et un identifiant (320) indiquant une version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier en vue de détecter la présence d'un code malveillant ; 20
- un générateur de hachage (430), en communication avec la base de données, et configuré pour générer un nouveau hachage de la région cible virale critique ; 25
- un module de sélection (410), en communication avec la base de données et le générateur de hachage, et configuré pour chaque agent agressif pour : 30
- comparer le nouveau hachage de la région cible virale critique au hachage précédemment généré de la région cible virale critique ;
- comparer l'identifiant de la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier en ce qui concerne l'identifiant de la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour inclure une mise à jour du module de détection ; et 35
- déterminer que le fichier n'a pas été infecté par un agent agressif quand le nouveau hachage et le hachage précédemment généré sont identiques et quand la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier n'est pas une version plus ancienne que la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour inclure une mise à jour du module de détection. 40
12. Système selon la revendication 11 dans lequel le module de sélection est de plus configuré pour : 45
- appliquer le module de détection au fichier en réponse à une détermination du fait que la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier est une version plus ancienne que la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour inclure une mise à jour du module de détection. 50
13. Système selon la revendication 12, comprenant de plus un module de mise à jour (415), en communication avec la base de données et avec le module de sélection, et configuré pour mettre à jour l'identifiant de la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier pour indiquer que la version la plus récente du moteur d'examen pour examiner le fichier est la version courante du moteur d'examen. 55
14. Système selon la revendication 11 dans lequel le module de sélection est de plus configuré pour appliquer le module de détection au fichier en réponse à une détermination pour l'agent agressif respectif du fait que le nouveau hachage et le hachage précédemment généré ne sont pas identiques.
15. Système selon la revendication 14 dans lequel un module de mise à jour (415) est configuré pour mettre à jour la base de données pour stocker le nouveau hachage de la région cible virale critique.
16. Système selon la revendication 11 comprenant un ensemble de modules de détection simples (420) utilisables pour réaliser des examens à haute vitesse sur le fichier.
17. Support lisible par ordinateur contenant des instructions de code informatique destinées à commander un système pour exécuter toutes les étapes d'un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 10.
18. Signal électrique portant des instructions réalisables par un processeur destinées à commander un processeur pour exécuter le procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 10.




FIG. 1




FIG. 2




FIG. 3




FIG. 4




FIG. 5